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Abstract 
Wireless networking is becoming a common element of industrial, corporate, 
and home networks. Commercial wireless network systems have become 
reliable, while the cost of these solutions has become more affordable than 
equivalent wired network solutions. The security risks of wireless systems are 
higher than wired and have not been studied in depth. This report starts to bring 
together information on wireless architectures and their connection to wired 
networks. We detail information contained on the many different views of a 
wireless network system. The method of using multiple views of a system to 
assist in the determination of vulnerabilities comes from the Information Design 
Assurance Red Team (IDARTTM) Methodology of system analysis developed at 
Sandia National Laboratories. 
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Views of Wireless Network Systems 
Section 1) Introduction 
Wireless networking is becoming a common element of industrial, corporate, and home 
networks. Commercial wireless network systems have become reliable while the cost of these 
solutions has become more affordable th& equivalent wired network solutions. 
Unfortunately, the security risks of wireless systems are higher than wired and have not been 
studied in depth. This report is a start in bringing together information on wireless 
architectures and their connection to wired networks. We detail information contained on the 
many different views of a wireless network system. The method of using multiple views of a 
system to assist in the determination of vulnerabilities comes from the Information Design 
Assurance Red Team (IDARTTM) Methodology of system analysis. The goal of the 
methodology is to identify architectural vulnerabilities of a system to some specific level of 
adversary. Effective and sustainable security requires a complete system approach rather than 
the application of individual security patches. The views are used to help determine 
vulnerabilities that might exist within various architectural pieces of the system. 
The main goal of this report is to provide guidance in performing system level security 
vulnerability analysis in hybrid wiredlwireless systems, i.e., communication systems that 
contain hard wired and h e l e s s  communicationlinks, protocols, andfor nodes. We draw a 
strong distinction between system level vulnerabilities and point level vulnerabilities, such as 
the ineffectiveness of the Wireless Equivalent Protocol (WEP). Our analysis approach will 
help identify where security mechanisms such as fuewalls, intrusion detection devices, IPSec, 
IEEE 802.1x, should be integrated into the system in order to mitigate vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerability analysis of any information systems that utilizes a combination of wireless and 
wired communication technologies, such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) systems, corporate networks, emergency response command centers, can benefit 
from the approach presented in this document. In addition, the uniqueness and complexities of 
modem hybrid information systems requires system level analysis to establish a meaningful 
understanding of the security posture of the system. 
The approach presented in this report differs from typical wireless security vulnerability 
analysis is several important ways. First, most security analyses focus on a single 
component, protocol, or sub-process, and give limited consideration to the interaction with 
other components, protocols, or sub-processes. Examples include Security in Wireless 
Residential Networks' and Intercepting Mobile Communications: The Insecurity of 80Z.IIZ. 
Our approach utilizes a system perspective by developing several views of the system 
(described below). Second, efforts such as Draft: Wireless Network Security, 802.11, 
~ l u e t o o t h ~ ~  and Handheld Device?, Secure and Mobile Networking4 and Defending Wireless 
Infrastructure Against the Challenge of DDOS Attach$ provide more of a system perspective, 
but as in most other cases, the emphasis is on potential solutions, rather than describing the 
vulnerabilities with context of a system. Third, texts Wireless Security Models, Threats, and 
Solutions6and Wireless Security End to End', provide reasonable levels of detail on wireless 
specific issues such as unique wireless threats and security solutions for particular threats, but 
neither outlines how to analyze a hybrid system. While solutions to security vulnerabilities 
are obviously the ultimate goal, without a thorough system analysis, confidence in the true 
effectiveness of a proposed solution is limited. Interaction between components, protocols and 
sub-systems must be considered to both discover system level vulnerabilities, and to evaluate 
proposed system level mitigation strategies. 
Our presentation utilizes an example hybrid system in order to illustrate as many common 
wireless components as possible, within the limitations of the technologies. We will 
concentrate our analysis on the wireless-to-wired network areas. With the methodology used, 
not every component is shown in every view; only the components that might be active or 
visible for that view will appear. This report assumes the reader has some basic knowledge 
about wireless networldng and terminologies. The views presented here may contain 
assumptions about other infrastructure components that may or may not actually be 
implemented within any given real wireless-to-wired architecture. Those assumptions are 
identified, as they become relevant for a particular view. The views presented here are those 
of the physical network, the logical network, one of network functionality, a spatial 
representation, and a temporal view. There may be many different names for each view, but 
each view is unique with respect to certain analysis points. The name given to each view is 
not important and is only meant for reference purposes. There may be more than one visual 
for each view category, when necessary to show additional detail. 
The remainder of the report proceeds as follows. Section 2) provides a brief overview of the 
IDARTTM methodology developed at Sandia National Laboratories. Section 3) describes the 
example network utilized for the view development and corresponding vulnerability analysis. 
Section 4) includes several views with explanations of the example system described in 
section 3. Section 5) discusses some operations of interest derived from the established views. 
Section 6 )  identifies some generic securitv vulnerabilities based on sections 3.4, and 5. 
. . 
Section 7) outlines how to ldevelop mitigation strategies based on the preceding results. And 
finally, section 8) draws some conclusions on the overall approach. 
Section 2) IDART, Methodology 
The Sandia National Laboratories IDARTTM methodolow includes several elements and 
.... w. 
activities supporting a structured process of analysis. This brief discussion covers those 
aspects of the process pertinent to this analysis. The discussion is not intended to serve as 
dekziption ofthe complete IDARTT~ methodology (there is a multi-day class for this 
purpose), but as introductory material to assist the reader in understanding the upcoming 
analysis. As applied in this analysis, the IDARTTM methodology exhibits three principal 
characteristics, listed below. 
1. It is a systematic approach, which supports: 
a. consistency of analysis; and 
b. repeatability of results. 
2. The distillation of design information related to the system under analysis provides: 
a. the creation of multiple views, which enhances the overall system 
understanding; and 
b. multiple views that direct analysis along different levels' and perspectives; and 
c. supplemental security design material often lacking in original system and 
design documentation. 
' Levels, in this context might refer to different layers of the protocol stack. 
8 
=. The process utilizes a variety of experts, while: 
a. enabling experts from related fields to provide useful analysis; 
b. integrating the analysis of multiple personnel. 
Achieving a complete understanding of highly complex systems is impractical, if not 
impossible. However, through meaningful assumptions and simplifying representations, the 
IDARTTM methodology captures the principle features of the system. This integrated, system 
level perspective allows subsystem experts to identify and postulate the effect of subsystem 
vulnerabilities on the overall system. In addition, the methodology allows for continuing the 
process through to creation of actual exploits for the identified vulnerabilities. (This 
particular analysis does not include the creation of actual exploits.) Combining the insight 
gained from creating various views, the indicated Operations of Interest, and the knowledge 
of subsystem vulnerabilities enables the identification of system vulnerabilities. 
The IDARTTM methodology helps create an integrated understanding of the system to support 
effective vulnerability analysis. This method utilizes multiple views of the system to assist in 
understanding process, and in the identification of critical interfaces and components. The 
views presented are based on an example system, described in section 3. Not all views will 
provide useful insight to some possible vulnerability, but multiple views are included to 
demonstrate the view creation aspect of the IDARTTM methodology. The next several sections 
provide explanations for the included views. 
Note: a view within the context of the IDARTTM methodology represents aspects of the 
system. The views can take the form of illustrations, network diagrams, tables, flowcharts, 
etc. The goal is to choose a view or series of views that help provide insight to the overall 
system. 
Section 3) Example Network Description 
The example network, shown in Figure 1, contains many different wireless and wired network 
features. Most current networks will not include all the features and devices depicted or 
implied in Figure 1, but the eclectic illustration assists the completeness of the analysis. 
Below is a listing of key wireless features found in this network. 
3.1 Key Features 
The wireless features discussed here are those most representative of features that are 
currently in use or might well be used in the future. Some features may have variations that 
are not depicted in this view, or any of the views that are presented in this report. The 
features are listed within Table 1 below, in no special order, but are numbered only for easier 
reference. Multiple features might exist on a single device, but shown as separate devices 
depending on the view. 
Figure 1. Physical View 
Table 1: Features of the Ex 
- 
Section 4) Views of the System 
4.1 Physical View 
The physical view depicts all the physical components of the system, and the connectivity 
between those components. A link is identified between components as long as there is a 
- 
physical layer connection (i.e. wired or wireless), regardless of any logical controls placed 
upon that link. A firewall or other device that contains access-control lists (or some other 
method of limiting dataflow) to limit or deny access between network segments is still 
connected to both segments and is capable of allowing data to flow between the segments. 
Other views, such as the Logical or Functional, are used to capture the operation of that 
component based upon its functionality and not its physical connectivity. 
This view contains many features that may be used in wireless networks along with a 
description of important data paths and the functions performed on those data paths. Not all 
features will be used in the average implementation. However, many features are used in 
combination. Most, if not all, of the components that make up the wireless system will be 
shown in this view, even if they might be passive in nature. Figure 1 is the graphic of this 
view. 
4.2 Data PathlFlow View 
The data paths or flows represent a key view in determining vulnerabilities. An attempt was 
made to identify all the paths that were available, according to the Physical View shown in 
Figure 1, that utilize some sort of wireless component and fixed infrastructure. Some paths 
are onlv of interest during s e t u ~  of a network connection while others are most important after 
- 
the connection is established and application data is flowing over the link. Many of the paths 
listed utilize the same transmission medium, but interact with different layers of the 
networking protocols and therefore are listed independently. Although we cannot illustrate 
every conceivable path, we provide a substantial number of paths here to help the reader 
apply this analysis approach to their unique system. 
The paths of interest in this paper are listed in Table 2 below, where the paths are separated 
into categories. Within each category, the possible physical paths are listed, with all 
intermediate points. Not all paths listed will expose a system vulnerability. However, the 
identification of all paths is critical to ensuring completeness of the analysis. 
Table 2: Data PathlFlow View 
1. Mobile Device D - Mobile Device C - WAPB - 
.... . - 
2. Mobile Device C - WAP B 
3. Mobile Device B - WAP B 
-- 
4. Mobile Device I3 - WAF'-* . 
5. Mobile Device A - Mobile WAP 
1. Mobile Device D - Mobile Device C - WAP B - network device(s) - 
WAS . 
2. Mobile Device C - WKK=.;eEork device(s) -WAS 
3. Mobile Device B - WAP B - network device(~) -WAS 
4. Mobile Device B - WAP A - netwprk device(s) -WAS 
. 
5. Mobile Device A - Mobile WAP - WAP A - network device(~) - 
WAS 
6. Mobile Device A - Mobile WAP - satellite A - Satellite 
network device(s) - WAS 
1. Mobile Device D -Mobile Device C - WAP B - network device(s) - 
DHCP 
2. Mobile Device C - WAP B -network device(s) - DHCPPP 
 
3. Mobile Device B - WAP B - network device@ - DHCP 
4. Mobile Device B - WAP A - network device(s) - DHCP 
5. Mobile Device A - Mobile WAP -GAP A -network device(s) - 
DHCP 
6. Mobile Device A - Mobile WAP - Satellite A -Satellite dish A - 
network device(s) - DHCP 
1. Mobile Device D - Mobile Device C - WAP B - network device(s) - 
EAP 
- - 
2. Mobile Device C - WAP B - network device@- EAP 
3. Mobile Device B - WAPPB - network device(s) - EAP 
4. Mobile Device B - WAP A - network device(~) - EAP 
- 
5. Mobile Device A - Mobile WAP - WAP A - network device(~) - 
EAP 
6. Mobile Device A - Mobile WAP - Satellite A - Satellite dish A - 
network device(s) - EAP 
Category 
Wireless client tolfrom 
wireless gateway 
tirewall 
Wireless client tolfrom 
VPN server 
Wireless client tolfrom 
wired network 
iostslservers 
Wireless client tolfrom 
Data Path 
1. Mobile Device D -Mobile Device C - WAP B - network device(s) - 
firewall 
2. Mobile Device C - WAP B -network device(s) - firewall 
3. Mobile Device B - WAP B -network device(~) - firewall 
- - 
4. Mobile Device B - WAP A - network device(s) - firewall 
-- 
5. Mobile Device A -Mobile WAP - WAP A - network device(~) - 
firewall 
-. - . 
6. Mobile Device A -Mobile WAP - Satellite A - Satellite dish A - 
network device(s) - firewall 
1. Mobile Device D -Mobile Device C - WAP B - network device(s) - 
. . 
VPN server 
2. Mobile Device C - WAP B -network device(s) - VPN server 
3. Mobile Device B - WAP B -network devicecs) - VPN server 
-  
4. Mobile Device B - WAP A - network device(s) - VPN sewer 
5. Mobile Device A - Mobile WAP - WAP A - network device(~) - 
VPN server 
6. Mobile Device A - Mobile WAP - Satellite A - Satellite dish A - 
network device(s) - VPN server 
1. Mobile Device D -Mobile Device C - WAP B -network device(s) - 
firewallNPN - wired systems 
2. Mobile Device C - WAP B -network device(s) - fiewalWPN - 
wired systems 
3. Mobile Device B - WAP B -network device(~) - firewalWPN - 
w i e t e m s  
-- 
4. Mobile Device B - WAP A -network device(s) - firewalWPN - 
wi-stems 
5. Mobile Device A - Mobile WAP - WAP A - network device(~) - 
. . 
firewallNPN - wired systems - 
6. Mobile Device A - Mobile WAP - Satellite A - Satellite dish A - 
network device(s) - firewallNPN -wired systems 
7. Mobile Device E - Wired Workstation 
1. Mobile Device D -Mobile Device C - WAP B -network device@) - 
Internet, through I firewall VPN - wired network - firewall/proxies - Internet . . - -. .. -. . . . -  . -. - -. -  lirewall proxies 2. Mobile Device C - WAP B - network device(s) - firewall~VPN - 
wired network - firewalV~oxies- Internet 
- 
3. Mobile Device B - WAP B -  network device(s) - firewalWPN - 
, , 
wired network - firewalVproxies - Internet 
4. Mobile Device B - WAP A - network device(~) - firewallNPN - I--
wired network - firewalVproxies Internet 
- -- - 
5 Mobile Device A - Mobile WAP - WAP A - networXdcnce(s) - 
firewalWPN -wired network - firewalVproxies- Internet 
6. Mobile Device A - Mobile WAP - Satellite A - Satellite dish A - 1- network device@) - firewalWPN - wired network - firewalVpmxies I Internet 
Wireless client tolfrorn I I .  Mobile Device D - Mobile Device C - WAP B - nework device(s) 
. . . . . . . . -. - . . . - . . . . . - -. - - . . -. . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 
Category I Data Path I 
wireless concentrating 2. Mobile Device C - WAP B - network device(s) 
network devices 6.e. L - ~ o b i l e  Device B - WAP B - network device(s) 
WAPs) 4. Mobile Device B - WAP A - network device(s) 
5. Mobile Device A -Mobile WAP - WAP A - network de&e(s) 
6. Mobile Device A - WAP - satellite A - Satellite dish A - 
I network device(s) 
Wireless keyboard I 1. Wireless Keyboard - Workstation 
client tolfrok wired I I 
workstation 
Wired hosts/setven 1. Wired workstation - Wireless Bridge A -Wireless Bridge B -Wired r 
through wireless workstation 
bridges 
Wireless client totfrom 1. Mobile Device A -Mobile WAP 
mobile WAP 
Mobile WAP tolfrom 1. Mobile WAP - WAP A 
stationary WAP I 
Mobile WAP tolfrom I 1. Mobile WAP - Satellite A - Satellite dish A I 
4.3 Network View 
The network view, shown in Figure 2, focuses on network operations, and represents a cross 
between the logical and physical views. Components are shown with regards to the 
networking function they provide. For example, the WAPs become hubs in this view since 
they concentrate data, but the data they concentrate can be accessible to all others near that 
same lo~ation.~ The wireless links have been replaced with implied wires since the device is 
communicating with the WAP. The wireless components shown in Figure 1 to connect the 
wired networks together (Wireless Bridges A & B) disappear in this view and are replaced by 
a "hub", just as the other WAPs. This hub implies that the data travels "outside" when 
moving between Wired Network A and Wired Network B. 
A hub uses a shared backplane that allows all physically connected devices to see all data that flows through 
the hub. For wireless networks, all devices that use the same physical layer methods are essentially using a 
Figure 2. Network View 
4.4 Logical View 
This view shows the logical network connections as seen by the user, and is sometimes 
referred to as the application-level view. Implied wires replace the wireless devices and 
networking equipment. Connections to the application servers are the only interesting 
features in this view, following data from the client device to the various servers. The 
wireless components shown in Figure 1 that connect parts of the wired network together 
(Wireless Bridges A 62 B) disappear altogether from this view, as does the separation of the 
two wired networks. See Figure 3 for this view. 
The Logical view incorporates the functional features of the devices in the system and arrives 
at a logical depiction of possible connections. Functions that require coordination between 
multiple devices are also included. For example, to authenticate a mobile device to a WAP, 
the intermediate network devices must allow connection to an authentication server. 
Communication must be supported and allowed between the mobile device and the WAP, as 
well as between the WAP and the authentication server. 
Figure 3. Logical View 
4.5 Temporal View 
The temporal view captures the aspect of change in the system over time. Many aspects of an 
information system may change over time, including communication connectivity, traffic 
volume, types of applications supported, etc. The selection of a time scale determines which 
temporal aspects are important in the analysis. For example, when a mobile wireless device 
connects to a wired infrastructure, the wireless link connectivity may change in a matter of 
seconds, as compared to the wired connectivity that is available from days to months. Thus, if 
a timescale of minutes is important to the functionality of the system, wireless connectivity is 
an important element of the system to analyze. 
There are multiple time periods shown on the temporal view. The black lines indicate both 
physical wires and wireless links that are intended to be constant. The dashed black lines are 
wireless links that are intended to be intermittent in nature such that if they aren't available, 
no problem is to be indicated. The solid green lines are to show links that are in place at some 
arbitrary time "X". The solid red lines are the links that are in place at some later time, "X" + 
"Y". This is to show that a wireless device can move from one "hub" to another at any point 
in time. This is not usually a feature of most wired networks. Figure 4 shows this view. 
Figure 4. Temporal View 
4.6 Spatial View 
The spatial view depicts the relative physical location of components of the system. In 
addition, referencing the spatial view with a fixed infrastructure or location enables 
establishment of physical boundaries. This view is particularly important to wireless 
information systems because it illustrates the coverage area for wireless communication 
systems, where the coverage area is specified by normal or intended operations. Introducing 
different communication components, such as directional antennas, higher-gain 
transmitters/receivers, can modify this coverage area. 
Multiple spatial views are included below, where each view represents a specific aspect of the 
overall system, but are shown separately to allow the depiction of additional details that can 
affect the performance of the wireless link. 
The first view, the one with two stationary WAPs, shows three mobile clients at different 
locations and is shown by Figure 5. Two clients do not have access to both WAPs at the same 
time, while one is within range of both. However, the proximity of the mobile clients would 
put mobile client B in a position to "see" communications to and from the other two mobile 
clients and their respective WAPs. 
"I 
Mobile 
Device A 
Overlap 
Coverage Area 
Mobile 
Device C 
/ 
rele: 
s PC 
Figure 5. Spatial View #1 
Y 
Router 
The second view, Figure 6 is the one with the mobile WAP and shows it communicating with a 
stationary WAP while at Location X. The second location, Y, is only in range of another mobile WAF' 
that has multiple wireless hops to get back to the wired network. 
Satellite 
4 4  Location Location 
Wireless 
Access 'j 
Point P . 
Satellite Coverage 
Dish 
Point 
Figure 6. Spatial View #2 
There was no spatial view created for the wireless keyboard. That device is a short-range 
device that must be within some small number of feet from the workstation, depending upon 
the actual protocol being used between the devices. There was also no spatial view created 
for the Mobile Device E (PDA-type device) either. 
Section 5) Operations of Interest 
The views described above help establish a baseline understanding of the system. The 
analysis now focuses on actions or operations that occur in the system. While there many 
different types of actions performed over the above paths, there are particular operations that 
typically interest an adversary. Paths of interest to an adversary normally include paths that 
provide control functions or some authentication function that might be subverted. Some of 
the more interesting operations are listed in Table 3 below. 
Section 6) Path Vulnerabilities 
This section will focus on identification of vulnerabilities for the various data paths. We 
make use of the various views and operations of interest documented in the previous sections 
to determine these paths and the corresponding vulnerabilities. Data paths identified 
previously (see Table 2) may be sub-paths of longer paths. Thus, if a path is contained within 
a longer path, the longer path will also contain the vulnerability identified for the shorter path. 
The vulnerabilities in this report are defined as affecting the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of a system. If a method for exploiting the vulnerability is known, it will be cited 
at the point the vulnerability is identified. 
All wireless client paths have, to some extent, the following generic vulnerabilities: 
Confidentiality - Data capture when 1) transmission not encrypted, 2) Weak encryption or 
algorithm is used, e.g. Wired Equivalency Protocol (WEP). 
Integrity - 1) Man-in-the-middle (MITM), attacker not necessarily closer to target, 2) 
spoofing, attacker not necessarily closer to target, 3) attacker can become a false WAP. 
Availability - Denial-of-Service (DOS) by 1) frequency jamming, 2) flooding WAP with 
"valid" traffic. 
Physical - Mobile devices axe generally less protected and more accessible for physical- 
type access attacks. 
Specific instances of vulnerabilities are listed here. 
Mobile-to-Mobile attacks. These include any attacks that could be perpetrated from 
machine to machine in a wired network. In the wireless world, these would be difficult to 
trace since there is not actual wiring to follow back to the attacker. 
Keystroke capture for wireless keyboard is a very stealthy method to use at a distance with 
a directional antenna. Additionally, sending keystrokes may be accomplished for systems 
using wireless keyboards, when they are left unattended. 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks can be accomplished with a pair of directional antennas and 
don't require the attacker to be physically between the client and the WAP. 
Access to the plain-text and the cipher-text for the same packet is available for some 
paths. This makes breaking the key possible for stream ciphers. 
The following table, Table 4, contains a high-level identification of vulnerability categories 
that are identified with each path. It contains the same paths identified in Table 2, in the left 
column. The right column contains the vulnerabilities associated with breaching 
Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A) on that path. These are vulnerability 
categories and not specific attacks that have been seen on the Internet. The listed 
vulnerabilities for a path must be examined with respect to the application that is to use that 
path to determine whether they are applicable or not. 
Path Category 
Wireless client totfrom 
wireless client 
Wireless client tolfrom 
WAP 
Wireless client totfrom 
wireless application 
server (WAS) 
Wireless client tolfrom 
DHCP server 
Wireless client totfrom 
extended authentication 
server (EAP) 
Path Vulnerability 
C: Leakage of authentication information between these 
wireless systems. 
I: Adversary could become relay between the systems, 
modifying any information that it passes. 
A: Depending upon the application being run by the remote system, 
denial to the services could be critical. The node could become 
isolated or the network partitioned. 
C: Leakage of authentication or addressing information. 
I: Adversary could place a WAP between the client and authorized 
WAP to collect or change information between the systems. They 
could also change important data as it passes. 
A: Without access to the WAP, most wireless clients will not be able 
to access services they need on the network. 
C: Information leakage, which is possibly sensitive if it contains 
usernames and passw&ls or other-information, such as personnel 
information or design specifications. 
I: The level of this vulnerability depends upon the importance of the 
information that can be modified. Modification of data that is destined 
as input to any program is always a bad thing. 
A: The importance of immediate access to the WAS is dependent on 
the importance of the service being provided. 
C: Target identification is enhanced by the leakage of DHCP 
information. 
I: Modification of DHCP traffic allows adversary to place a rogue 
DHCP server in place and control all the parameters such as Domain 
Name Servers and Default Gateway. This is used for Man-In-The- 
Middle setups. 
A: Without access to the DHCP server, a user workstation might not 
be able to connect to the network properly and therefore receives no 
service from the system. 
C: Leakage of authentication credentials, passwords, password 
hashes, or certificates allow impersonation by an adversary. 
I: Modification of authentication stream can allow adversary to 
blacklist user, modify login parameters, or steal a users identity. 
A: Denying access to the authentication server will keep authorized 
users from accessing any facilities or services of the system. 
7 1 Wireless client tolfrom 
VPN server 
Wireless client tolfrom 
wired network 81
Internet, through 
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client tolfrom wired 
workstation 
-- 
Path Vulnerability 
C: Leakage of sensitive information, such as usernames, passwords, 
keys, certificates, and other sensitive application information allowing 
impersonation or data theft. 
I: Modification of application data, passwords, and other information 
can occur with varying degrees of importance. 
A. Without access to the gateway, the client system will not be able to 
acquire services from the networked systems. 
C: Leakage of application data, which could include usernames, 
passwords, keys, sensitive information, etc. The main function of a 
VPN is to disallow this. 
I: Modification of possibly sensitive information. 
A: Without network access to the VPN server, processing of sensitive 
information is forced to be in the clear. 
C: Leakage of information that normally wouldn't be available. The 
wired servers or hosts might normally be accessed by internally wired 
systems and the applications aren't protecting the information from 
disclosure during transmission. 
I: Modification of information during transmission is allowed due to 
the use of a wireless component. Wired hosts and servers could have 
the implied assumption that all users are connecting via a wired 
connection. 
A: Denying this access will keep information from being sent or 
received with a remote site. If decisions are being based on this 
information, timely decisions will be affected. 
C: Leakage of encrypted traffic could occur since adversary could 
have access to the plaintext and encrypted text for the same message. 
I: With broken encryption keys from the above attack, new messages 
could be created as modifications or real traffic. 
A: See #8 above. 
See #6 above. 
C: Leakage of sensitive information, such as usernames and 
passwords as well as other information that is typed into applications. 
I: Modification of input to applications. Input to the workstation from 
a distance without knowledge of the user. The running of programs 
without knowledge of the user. 
A: Without keyboard access to most workstations, it is difficult to 
perform any real tasks. Console access is generally better connected, 
with more privileges, than remote access. 
Path Category 
Wired hostdservers 
totfrom satellite 
Path Vulnerability 
C: Leakage of sensitive information, including usernames, passwords, 
keys, other credentials, and sensitive application data. This 
information might normally be protected from disclosure by being sent 
through a protected wire and is now sent wireless. 
I: There is some chance that modification of information as it passes 
by can be accomplished. It would need to be extremely targeted. 
Injection of data packets would be possible. 
A: Denying access to the satellite will keep information from being 
sent or received with a remote site. If decisions are being based on 
I I this information, timely decisions will be affected. 
I Wireless client totfrom 1 See #2 above. 
I I system to occur. 
15 1 Mobile WAP tolfrom I See #14 above. 
mobile WAP 
Mobile WAP tolfrom C: Leakage of information, such as address information or 
An important item to note is that some applications could make implicit assumptions that 
traffic between the client and server take place on a wire, not a wireless link. This type of 
assumption might come into play with applications that were written before wireless 
networking was readily available. Remember too, that modification of any data destined to a 
program is probably a bad thing. 
stationary WAP 
Section 7) Benefits to Mitigation Design Approach 
authentication information as it is passed between WAPs. 
I: Modification of address or authentication information to allow 
adversary system to supplant identity of an already authenticated 
system. 
A: Denial of this transfer will cause a re-authentication of the original 
This section discusses advantages that might be gained by mitigation design with regards to 
vulnerabilities identified. As in any good design project, the actual design would be created 
for a specific system, according to the needs of its functional and security requirements. 
However, there are other factors that will influence the security design of any mitigation for a 
system. 
To develop strategies for mitigation of vulnerabilities, one must first have determined the 
vulnerabilities. Examination of Table 3 allows the determination of which overations an 
adversary might examine to identify their opportunities. Even though this list is small in size, 
it is rich with specific areas to be explored. Table 4 also needs to be examined when 
determining which vulnerabilities need to be mitigated. Utilizing these lists, a set of priorities 
is developed with which to guide the design of mitigations. 
Advantages of this strategy include: 
s An overall understanding of how and where data flows (both control and application) 
Better understanding of communications needs 
Removal of "low-hanging fruit" from adversary reach 
More robust system 
For insight into how this type of analysis relates to designing a secure system, the reader is 
encouraged to look at Communication Vulnerabilities and Mitigations in Wind Power SCADA 
Systems 8.  That document outlines an approach for designing securing wind power SCADA systems. 
An import task included in the approach is the identification of potential system level communication 
vulnerabilities, which follow directly from the process discussed in this document. 
Section 8) Conclusions 
In this paper, we have identified many of the wireless networking structures that are likely to be found 
in deployed communication networks and information systems. Using the IDARTTM assessment 
technique for assessing systems, which is described within the paper, we then identified vulnerabilities 
that can exist within these svstems. From this analvsis. it is clear that there are multiole voints where 
. , A 
security must be integrated k t o  the wireless system, based upon the functional and security 
requirements of the system. Specific mitigations for vulnerabilities have not been identified since they 
wiil realistically depend upon the level ofiecurity needed for a particular application within a system: 
Wireless components can be securely integrated into information systems, but do require the integrator 
to design specific mitigations using a systems perspective. If wireless networking is being added to 
existing systems, a security assessment must be performed on the system to determine the necessary 
mitigations and their placement. These mitigations must be designed from the systems perspective 
and serve a specific purpose within the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability goals for that 
system. 
Finally, this report covers one of the two main results from the LDRD effort entitled, "Surety 
Enhancement for Wireless Automated Control Networks." The other principal result is discussed in 
the paper, Communication Vulnerabilities and Mitigations in Wind Power SCADA Systems, which was 
oresented at Windpower 2003. Mav 18-21.2003 in Austin. TX. In that vaoer, we describe kev aspects 
. a .  
bf how to approach securing a'wind power'SCADA system. Although we specifically focused oi 
wind Dower issues, the approach applies to most other SCADA systems. The connection between the 
two documents is that theanalysisof the wireless vulnerabilities bf a system should be performed in 
conjunction with the overall secure system design. For instances, in the Communication 
Vulnerabilities and Mitigations in Wind Power SCADA Systems document, several wireless 
vulnerabilities which arise from weaknesses in current technology combined with common SCADA 
communication architectures are listed. While this document focuses on general wireless vulnerability 
analysis, the Communication Vulnerabilities and Mitigations in Wind Power SCADA Systems 
document provides an example of how to proceed with designing of a secure SCADA system. We 
encourage the use of both documents in the process of developing a secure system. 
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